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RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM AS A FELONY:
ANTITRUST AND THE PRISONER'S
DILEMMAt
John Shepard Wiley Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The idea of cooperation sounds heartening. Cooperation is the
milk of human kindness, the Good Samaritan, and "hope for the future of our species." 1 The lawyers who practice and write in the field
of antitrust, however, take a different view. For them, cooperation is a
crime.2
This essay is about the idea of cooperation in antitrust law. At the
outset, ·I clarify my terminology. Biologists often refer to reciprocal
altruism. 3 "Reciprocal altruism" in the antitrust context has an odd
semantic ring. There is nothing altruistic or self-sacrificing about the
cooperation that antitrust rules outlaw: cartel price fixing. Firms do
it strictly for the money. I prefer the term reciprocity to describe a
firm's strategy to pursue behavior that will profit it only if competing
firms engage in similar behavior. This usage can create confusion in
t © John Shepard Wiley Jr.

1988.
• Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank Jonathan Bendor, Robert Boyd, Jack
Hirshleifer, Richard Posner, Mark Ramseyer, and Eric Rasmusen for helpful comments. Errors
are my responsibility.
1. R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984) (comments of Lewis Thomas on
book jacket). It is no accident that a leading scholarly journal in the field is titled the Journal of

Conflict Resolution.
2. See also Lowenstein, For God, far Country, or for Me? (Book Review), 74 CALIF. L. REV.
1479 (1986). He states:
Bribes, whatever else they may be, are a form of mutually beneficial exchange, or reciproc·
ity. Reciprocity is normally desirable, a cornerstone of human relations in economic, social,
political, and personal matters.... Having a concept of bribery, then, means identifying as
immoral or criminal a subset of transactions and relationships within a set that, generally
speaking, is fundamentally beneficial to mankind, both functionally and intrinsically.
Id. at 1480-81. Cf. D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 101 (1957) ("[I]n some
contexts, if the two players are frustrated [in their attempt to cooperate], it may be beneficial to
society.").
3. Biologists are intensely interested in the scientific basis for this praised virtue. I presented
a version of this paper at a UCLA-sponsored workshop on reciprocal altruism. Most of the
workshop participants were behavioral biologists, interested in the problems of altruism in an
evolutionary setting. The papers presented at the workshop, including a version of this Article,
appear in 9 ETHOLOGY AND SocIOBIOLOGY 241 (1988).
"Reciprocal altruism" also seems inapt in the biological context; biologists themselves seem
to refer to the term without any necessary invocation of the common-sense implication of

benevolence.
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the present context, however, because reciprocity is also an antitrust
term of art that refers to one firm's decision to sell to another only if
the second agrees in turn to buy from the first. 4 In this Article I use
reciprocity in the former sense rather than in its latter, antitrust sense.
Antitrust is a well established field, as American law goes. It has
been an active one since 1890, when Congress passed the landmark
Sherman Act, 5 a delphic congressional pronouncement whose brevity
forced judges to take the lead in formulating specific antitrust policy.
Some of the earliest Sherman Act decisions clarified that the Act's ban
on contracts in restraint of trade included cartel agreements. 6 Just as
Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Iraq cqntinually strive to overcome their differences in pursuit of high OPEC oil prices, so did Adam Smith say
business people too seldom gather, even for merriment and diversion,
without their talk soon turning to some contrivance or conspiracy
against the public. 7 In market economies founded on competition
among economic producers, producer cooperation in raising price (or
restricting output) hurts consumers. Judges thus have interpreted the
Sherman Act to contain a "per se" rule against price fixing agreements: if two or more competitors meet and expressly agree to sell
their product only above some specified price, antitrust law metes out
harsh penalties. 8 Antitrust thereby aims to root out and destroy this
simple and undesirable type of producer reciprocity.
Antitrust judges have attacked producer cooperation beyond flatly
outlawing express cartel agreements. For fear that competitors will
tacitly cooperate, antitrust law has outlawed activity that has both a
potential for social benefit and that does not involve express cartelization - but that might increase the chance of successful reciprocity. 9
The judges who have authored this law plainly believe that firms
might engage in reciprocal altruism (or "tacit collusion" or "conscious
parallelism"), and that that risk to competition is great enough to justify prophylactic losses in business efficiency. But their views stem
solely from casual intuitions about the likelihood that reciprocal or
tacitly "collusive" arrangements in fact will succeed in supplanting
competition.
In the last twenty years, however, skeptical commentators have
4. See, e.g., Federal Trade Commn. v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
5. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1982)).
6. E.g., United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd., 115 U.S.
211 (1899).
7. A. SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1796).
8. E.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
9. E.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
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attacked the law these judges have made. 10 Essentially atheoretical
legal doctrine thus has proved vulnerable to shifting attitudes of a fundamentally political nature. Recent game theory research, most
prominently by Robert Axelrod, offers the hope of filling this theoretical void and providing antitrust doctrine with a more stable foundation.11 Yet Axelrod's work, while of great potential interest to the
antitrust world, contains limitations that block any direct transfer of
his results to the Sherman Act. These limitations suggest an agenda
for future game theory research and its application to antitrust
doctrine.
II.

Two SCHOOLS OF ANTITRUST THOUGHT: FAITH AND
SKEPTICISM ABOUT THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION

Antitrust law makes crucial -. and vulnerable - assumptions
about the likelihood of reciprocity that causes harmful consequences
to consumers. In this section, I first describe antitrust doctrines that
demonstrate robust faith that firms indeed will tacitly cooperate to reduce pricing rivalry. I focus on two different antitrust doctrines that
embody assumptions about the likelihood and harms of reciprocity:
the law governing data exchanges among competitors, and the law
governing mergers. Then I will recount the extent to which recent
criticism of those doctrines has caused a revision in antitrust policy.
This brief survey demonstrates that antitrust law inevitably incorporates some theory about reciprocity, but that no such theory has had a
very strong or enduring intellectual foundation.
A.

Data Exchanges

Competing firms can wish to communicate with one another to
discover current market prices and conditions. Often these industry
communications take place within a trade association. Since the early
days of antitrust enforcement, "trustbusters" have viewed the activities of trade associations with suspicion: suspicion of reciprocity. In
light of later game theory scholarship, the strength of - and lack of
support for - this suspicion has been remarkable.
A landmark decision, American Column & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 12 illustrates this point. The case concerned hardwood lumber
mills that participated in the "Open Competition Plan" of the American Hardwood Manufacturers' Association (AHMA). The associa10. See notes 32-41 infra and accompanying text.
11. See Part III.C infra and note 65 infra.
12. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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tion developed a plan that required mills to submit to it daily reports
of sales quantities, prices, and customer identities, as well as monthly
reports of production and stocks. The association then provided members with weekly reports of industry sales and shipments, and monthly
reports of production, inventory, prices, and market conditions. The
association also inspected members' stocks and grading practices and
held periodic meetings to discuss past and future production.
These practices might have facilitated collusive pricing, especially
because there was an indication that industry officials sometimes used
meetings to harangue firms about the need to restrain their output. In
particular, the chairman at one such meeting said, "If there is no increase in production, particularly in oak, there is going to be good
business. No man is safe in increasing his production. If he does, he
will be in bad shape, as the demand won't come." 13 But there was no
direct evidence that the AHMA actually had promoted reciprocity,
either by setting minimum prices or by punishing price cutters. The
Court did claim that there was evidence that the AHMA's plan had
"contributed greatly" to an increase in hardwood prices. 14 Still, the
Court did not isolate the cause of this price increase, and it is plain
from the face of the opinion "that [the relevant year] was a year of
high and increasing prices generally and that wet weather may have
restricted [hardwood] production to some extent." 15 Inflation, booming demand, and decreased supply thus might have accounted fully for
the hardwood price increase, leaving no support for the Court's inference that the AHMA's action indeed had replaced price-competition
with price-reciprocity. Instead, the Court's decision rested heavily
upon a belief that dangerously successful reciprocity was highly
probable.
It was not costless for the Court to outlaw the private data dissemination at issue in the American Column case. All else being equal,
uncertainty usually is economically undesirable. Firms' ability to plan
and act efficiently is improved when uncertainty about present and
future market conditions is reduced, a point that Justice Holmes' dissent pressed forcefully. 16 The majority opinion did not try to argue
that disseminating data about market conditions was a worthless activity. Rather, the Court responded by stating a theory that reciproc13. 257 U.S. at 402 (emphasis omitted).
14. 257 U.S. at 409.
15. 257 U.S. at 409.
16. 257 U.S. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I should have supposed that the Sherman Act
did not set itself against knowledge . . . . I should have thought that the ideal of commerce was
an intelligent interchange made with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for a forecast of the
future on both sides.").
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ity inevitably posed a live threat to competition. The Court said this
point was proved:
by the disposition of men to follow their most intelligent competitors,
especially when powerful; by the inherent disposition to make all the
money possible, joined with the steady cultivation of the value of "harmony" of action; and by the system of reports, which makes the discovery of price reductions inevitable and immediate. The sanctions of the
plan obviously are, financial interest, intimate personal contact, and
business honor, all operating under the restraint of exposure of what
would be deemed bad faith and of trade punishment by powerful rivals.
'

. . . Men in general are so easily persuaded to do that which will
obviously prove profitable that [the] reiterated opinion from the analyst
of their association, with all obtainable data before him, that higher
prices were justified and could easily be obtained, must, inevitably have
resulted, as it did result, in concert of action in demanding them.17

Particularly significant was the large number of firms involved in
the case. The majority opinion mentioned - but did not stress - that
some 365 firms participated in the "Open Competition Plan." 18 These
firms, moreover, produced a total of only one-third of United States
hardwood output. 19 The majority's empirical guess about reciprocity
was thus that noncompetitive behavior was virtually inevitable under
the circumstances, despite hundreds of participants within the AHMA
and hundreds more outside it. The Court theorized that business
firms in this situation would find it easy to collude on setting high
prices. A similar attitude is evident in later data dissemination cases,
although the number of participants involved was smaller. 20 Antitrust
law in these decisions has incorporated the suspicions of Adam
Smith. 21
B. Merger Law

Past merger doctrine also reveals a similar theory about reciprocity. If trustbusters have been suspicious of the collusive implications
of data exchanges, they have been downright fearful of the similar implications of mergers. Unlike the Court in American Column, antitrust judges in merger cases generally have focused explicitly on the
question of market share: the percentage of market sales or assets that
each competitor controls. Merger law specifies under what conditions
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

257 U.S. at 399, 407 (quotations omitted and emphasis added).
257 U.S. at 391.
257 U.S. at 391.
See, e.g., United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
See text accompanying note 7 supra.
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antitrust courts will permit two existing companies to unite into one
larger unit. (Here I am concerned only with so-called "horizontal"
mergers, or mergers between direct competitors. If we assume that
soft drinks compete directly with each other, then Coke's attempted
purchase of Dr. Pepper, and Pepsi's attempted purchase of 7-Up, are
examples of attempted horizontal mergers.) Companies may merge
for reasons as diverse as the managers who run them, but two explanations typically predominate: first, mergers can yield efficiencies in production that improve a company's competitive position and can benefit
consumers; second, mergers can place independent competitors under
a single control, thereby eliminating competition, creating market
power, and enforcing producer cooperation.
·
On general principles, one might oppose large mergers because
they increase economic concentration, which some hold to be intrinsically objectionable. With increased international competition, this
view is not as popular in the 1980s as it was in the 1950s and 1960s,
and this Article will pursue it no further. Instead, I will assume (in
keeping with currently prevalent but certainly not indisputable views)
that the objective in merger law is to permit those mergers that create
efficiencies but to block those that create offsetting market power. 22
Thus conceived, merger law asks how many competitors must remain
in a market to forestall harmful pricing reciprocity among them.
Under this theory, mergers that leave at least this number should be
legal, while those crossing this critical threshold should not.
With the 1950 Celler-Kefauver amendments to the Clayton Act, 23
merger regulation in the United States gained teeth. In 1968, the Department of Justice published Merger Guidelines24 setting forth quantitative levels that would trigger agency opposition to a proposed
merger. As a self-conscious policy summary by an elite federal
agency, these Guidelines were notable and influential. In general
terms, the Department committed itself to oppose all mergers in which
the two companies each had five percent or more of the market before
the merger. 25 This administrative guideline disclosed a belief that (if
all firms are of equal size) pricing reciprocity - the implicit harm to
be avoided - will occur if fewer than twenty market participants ex22. The fundamental article on this now highly elaborated approach is Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs, 58 AM. EcoN. REV. 18 (1968).
23. Celler-Kefauver Act, ch. 1184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 18, 21 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
24. U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines - 1968, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) ~
13,101 (1988).
25. Id. at p. 20,523.
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ist, but is difficult to the point of impossibility when more firms occupy
the market.
The judicial merger decisions of the 1960s, when Chief Justice Earl
Warren presided over the Supreme Court, reveal a similar but even
stronger suspicion of reciprocity. In 1966, the Court invalidated a
merger of the Von's Grocery and the Shopping Bag supermarket
chains in Los Angeles. 26 In 1958, two years before the merger, Von's
operated twenty-seven stores in the area and Shopping Bag operated
thirty-four. 27 The largest chain accounted for but 8% of area grocery
sales; Von's was third with 4.7%; and Shopping Bag was sixth with
4.2%. 28 The merged Von's/Shopping Bag company thus would have
accounted for about 8 percent of a market in which there were over
3000 single-store firms and over 100 chains of two or more stores. 29
As the dissent pungently noted, "Three thousand five hundred and
ninety single-store firms is a lot of grocery stores." 30 Nonetheless, the
majority said that this merger's slight increase in firm size and reduction in the number of competitors was excessive. 31 Once again, it is
plain that antitrust decisionmakers believed that rivalry could easily
evolve into cartelization.
C. Reciprocity: Skepticism and Scorn

Influential critics have attacked this antitrust policy, and in a subtle but definite way they have succeeded in modifying it. Two significant conclusions follow. First, the critics' subtle success shows the
weakness of the foundation for earlier beliefs. Second, the critics' attack has embodied a different theory of reciprocity, one more skeptical
about the likelihood of successful cooperation.
I cannot document change in the relevant antitrust doctrine by the
usual and most positive method of citing later cases that overrule earlier ones. The Burger and Rehnquist Courts of the 1970s and 1980s
have decided neither directly relevant merger cases nor any data dissemination cases at all. Case law thus does not directly show changing
attitudes about the likelihood of business pricing reciprocity.
Notwithstanding this lack of direct evidence of change, it is quite
unlikely that the Court would decide cases like Von's Grocery the same
way today. Academic commentators, convinced of the hardiness of
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
384 U.S. at 272.
384 U.S. at 281 (White, J., concurring).
384 U.S. at 273.
384 U.S. at 300 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
384 U.S. at 277.
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competition and the fragility of cooperation, have fiercely criticized
the Warren Court's strict treatment of mergers. Among the most
prominent has been Robert Bork, President Reagan's rejected nominee to the Supreme Court. While a professor, Bork developed a theme
of Stigler's to ridicule the Warren Court's merger doctrine. 32 He instead proposed that courts permit mergers "up to 60 or 70 percent of
the market," a "guess" that he was willing to weaken "[p]artly as a
tactical concession to current oligopoly phobia and partly in recognition of [a later statutory amendment's] intended function of tightening
[earlier merger rules]." 33 Bork's final recommendation therefore was
to permit mergers up to a market share "that would allow for other
mergers of similar size in the industry and still leave three significant
companies. " 34 Elsewhere in his work, Bork describes his difficulty
with
the uncertainty of the premise that tacit collusion is an important phenomenon, or even that it is a real phenomenon. . . . The difficulty of
maintaining small-number cartels based upon detailed communication
and agreement should ... make us dubious that concerted action without explicit collusion is likely to be at all common or successful. 35

Criticism like that by Professor Bork affected the merger policy of
the Reagan administration in the 1980s. Under President Reagan, the
Department of Justice revised the Department's 1968 Merger Guidelines. This revision, completed in 1984, adopted a complex quantitative rule to specify when the Department now will attack or permit
mergers. 36 For simplicity of explanation, assume all firms within a
market are the same size before a merger. In that situation the 1984
Guidelines permit two firms to merge into one if a total of eleven competitors remains afterwards - but not if a total of only ten remains. 37
Recall that the 1968 Guidelines promised much stricter opposition to
mergers, to the point of challenging mergers that left as many as
nineteen firms. 3 s By lowering the critical threshold from nineteen to
ten, the 1984 revision showed a marked increase in official tolerance of
market concentration - stemming from a marked increase in official
skepticism about the likelihood of pricing reciprocity. The Supreme
32. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST p ARADOX 178-224 (1978). See Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly,
72 J. POL. EcoN. 44 (1964).

33. R. BORK, supra note 32, at 221.
34. Id. at 222.
35. Id. at 175. See also id. at 179-91.
36. U.S. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines - 1984, 49 Fed. Reg. 26,823, 26,831
(1984).
37. Id.
38. See text at notes 24-25 supra. I continue to analyze both Guidelines under the unlikely
but simplifying assumption that all firms in the market are of equal size before the merger.
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Court has echoed a similar sentiment in recent dicta. 39
Ill.

MARKET COMPETITION AS THE PRISONER'S DILEMMA

Critics like Bork attacked prevailing antitrust assumptions about
reciprocity on essentially negative grounds. Older theory had suggested that added market concentration enlarged the prospect of reciprocity - without contributing much to those markets' productive
efficiency. The critics savaged this conventional economic learning
about oligopolies as vague, illogical, and essentially empty.40 The critics' case concentrated more on refuting the claims of the existing literature than on building affirmative, formal, and decisive theoretical
support for the thesis that reciprocity indeed was unlikely. A typical
style of reasoning, for instance, was that "[i]f explicit collusion is difficult to arrange and hard to enforce if arranged, tacit collusion must be
next to impossible."41
This scholarly attack of the 1960s and 1970s long has been familiar
news to the legal antitrust community.42 The critics who authored
this attack worked largely independently of contemporaneous game
theory research that strongly supported their skepticism about market
reciprocity. The research concerned the most extensively canvassed
problem in game theory: the prisoner's dilemma. In this section, I
first describe the prisoner's dilemma and connect its literature with the
scholarly attack of the 1960s and 1970s. I do so not to assert the correctness of the critics' attack, but rather because later analysis of the
prisoner's dilemma implies error in that attack. Game theory, while
apparently supportive of the Bork critique, thus may prove ultimately
most damaging of that critique. As I complete my survey of these
most recent developments and evaluate their significance for antitrust
policy, however, it becomes clear that we need research into three specific questions before this game theory can resolutely inform antitrust
policy.
39. Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 108 S. Ct. 1515, 1521 (1988)
("Cartels are neither easy to form nor easy to maintain.").

40. E.g., R. BORK, supra note 32; J. McGEE, IN DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CoNCENTRA•
TION (1971); Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRA•
TION: THE NEW LEARNING 164 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974); Demsetz,
Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J.L. & EcoN. 55 (1968).
41. Y. BROZEN, CONCENTRATION, MERGERS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 135 (1982).
0

42. For example, a volume containing a number of key studies was co·edited by a leading
antitrust law casebook author and is still published by a legal press. See INDUSTRIAL CONCEN·
TRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J. Weston eds. 1974).
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The Prisoner's Dilemma

The prisoner's dilemma is a stock game theory problem43 named
after the following fable. The police nab a pair suspected of a crime,
separate them, and present each with the following proposition. If one
confesses and supplies evidence that can convict the other who refuses
to talk, the authorities will release the confessor and throw the book at
the silent one. If both prisoners remain silent, the authorities have
evidence to convict both only on minor charges. If both prisoners confess, both are in big trouble. Without communicating, each prisoner
must choose either to remain silent or to confess.
A prisoner who remains silent "cooperates" with the partner. Abbreviate this prisoner's strategy as C. Convention correspondingly
holds that one who confesses "defects" (abbreviated D), or "cheats,"
or, most colorfully, "finks." Because each prisoner has two options
(play C or play D), a two-by-two matrix can display this game's four
possible outcomes. Each of the matrix's four cells summarizes one
outcome by listing pairs of numbers (or "payoffs," which here represent a bad rather than a good). The first number in the pair is the
resulting jail time for the first player, ROW, and the second is the jail
time for the second player, COLUMN.44
43. Shubik attributes the prisoner's dilemma game to a 1950 Stanford University mimeograph by A.W. Tucker. M. Sl:IUBIK, GAME THEORY IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 254 (1982).
44. The values in this matrix are conventional but arbitrary. Generally and formally, a set of
inequalities defines the prisoner's dilemma. Label the four possible payoffs with four letters: R
(Reward); S (Sucker's payoll); T (Temptation); and P (Punishment). Define these payoffs as
follows:
COLUMN PLAYER

R
0

w

p
L
A

cooperate

cooperate

defect

(R,R)

(S,T)

y

E
defect
(f,S)
(P,P)
R
Assume that the bigger the payoff the better. (Obviously the situation is reversed if numbers
represent a bad, as in the jail time example in text.) The game is a prisoner's dilemma ifT > R
> P > S. Most analysts add the condition that R > (I +S)/2, and some add that P > (I
+S)/2. See, e.g., Boyd & Richerson, The Evolution of Reciprocity in Sizable Groups, 132 J.
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 337 (1988).
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COLUMN PLAYER

R
0

w

p
L
A

cooperate:

silence

cooperate:
silence

defect:
confess

(1,1)

(5,0)

y

(0,5)
(3,3)
E
defect: confess
R
Parentheses: (jail time for ROW, jail time for COLUMN)

The prisoner's dilemma is a generally interesting model for two
reasons. First, it represents a common situation: the conflict that
arises when individual actions benefit a group but are costly to
individual members. Second, it leads to stark paradox. No matter
what the partner does, each individual will do better by cheating.
(Check this logic yourself on the matrix. First assume that your
partner remains silent. Then assume your partner confesses. You will
see that, in either event, you minimize your own jail time by
confessing.) Even though the group of two prisoners would benefit if
each prisoner cooperated by remaining silent, rational and informed
self-interest leads both prisoners to their worst outcomes: each
receives a heavy penalty for failing to cooperate with the other. This
context for group cooperation thus frustrates individual aims, a result
that occurs even if players repeatedly encounter the situation. 45
B. Prisoner's Dilemma and Skepticism About Reciprocity
The prisoner's dilemma is directly relevant to antitrust policy.
Consider a market in which there exists only two producers - a "duopoly." For illustration, suppose the market again is for soft drinks,
and that one firm inakes Coke (and Dr. Pepper) and the other makes
Pepsi (and 7-Up). If consumers think soft drinks are pretty much the
same and so buy mainly on the basis of price, then Coke and Pepsi
each face the same problem: What price should I charge?
The duopolists face a prisoner's dilemma - a fact that the antitrust literature has neglected but that game theorists and some economists have appreciated for at least thirty years. 46 Both firms prefer the
high price that a monopolist would select if a single firm controlled the
entire soft drink market, yet each distrusts the other's willingness to
45. See text at note 49 infra.
46. D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 97 (1957); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS
480-83 (8th ed. 1970).
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cooperate by maintaining that high price. .lfthe two firms could cooperate in pricing at this high level, then they could divide the monopoly
profit that this market offers them. Assume that the alternative to this
high cooperative monopoly price is a lower price - like that produced
by competition. Competition is costly for the duopolists; its dollar
cost is measured precisely by monopoly profits the two forgo.
Because the Sherman Act outlaws contractual price cooperation
between firms, the two must decide in every time period what price
level to choose. If this pricing game occurs only once (for instance, a
sealed bid for a huge one-time Pentagon soft drink supply contract)
then the classical logic of the one-time prisoner's dilemma game governs: both Coke and Pepsi, if rational, will opt for the low noncooperative price. Even though both would benefit from high
cooperative prices, the reward for noncooperative behavior (together
with mutual fear that the other firm will selfishly exploit any cooperative overtures) dooms attractive producer cooperation and assures
consumers of the benefits of low competitive prices. In the one-shot
game, noncooperation (or competitive pricing, in the cartel context) is
a dominant strategy - a strong conclusion denoting that "picking the
low price is the best strategy no matter what the other player does. If
the prisoner's dilemma is repeated a finite number of times, noncooperation is not a dominant strategy - but neither is anything else. We
thus must employ other and less robust solution concepts to define the
game's "result." The conventional alternative is the Nash equilibrium,
which defines a set of strategies such that no one player, regarding
others as committed to their choices, can improve its fortunes. 47 A
Nash (or any other) equilibrium is said to be perfect if the players'
threats that support it are credible.48 In the finitely repeated prisoner's
dilemma, the unique perfect Nash equilibrium is the noncooperative
strategy of "cheating" or "finking" on each move. 49 This analysis thus
suggests that, over time, both firms will repeat the one-shot result of
charging low prices.
This result is striking for antitrust analysts. Even for the most
concentrated oligopoly conceivable, this conclusion directly contra47. Nash, Non-cooperative Games, 54 ANNALS OF MATHEMATICS 286 (1951).
48. Selten, Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive
Games, 4 INTL. J. GAME THEORY 25 (1975).
49. E. RAsMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION (forthcoming).
My discussion deals only with theoretical analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma. The empirical
work on the topic is vast, highly suggestive, and beyond my present focus. An extremely helpful
survey can be found in Roth, Laboratory Experimentation in Economics: A Methodological Overview, EcoN. J. (forthcoming, Dec. 1988); see also Caporael, Dawes, Orbell, & Van de Kragt,
Selfishness Examined: Cooperation in the Absence of Egoistic Incentives, (manuscript on file at
Michigan Law Review).
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diets the Court's unrestrained confidence in American Column that
data exchanges ought to be illegal because it is so easy to persuade
competitors - even in large numbers - to do "that which will obviously prove profitable." 50 The dilemma of the situation is that cooperation can elude even those who are desperately aware of its allure.
The implications for merger law are equally subversive. This game
theory suggests that law could permit firms to merge until only two
remained in the market. As long as contracts to fix prices remained
unenforceable, the game's logic suggests that even this highly concentrated duopoly would encounter the same inability to achieve high cooperative prices. This implication suggests that when the Department
of Justice rejected earlier law in 1984, its revisionism did not go far
enough.
I certainly do not claim that, without the prisoner's dilemma, industrial organization scholars had no clue that cartel efforts were
prone to a cheating incentive. Unlike antitrust judges, economists'
skepticism about cooperation has been long-standing and widespread.
For instance, a recent economic analysis of OPEC concluded that
OPEC is exactly what it appears to be: a cartel that has lasted quite a
while. 51 This news would scarcely be noteworthy were it not for the
prevalent belief among economists that successful and prolonged cooperation is virtually impossible. 52 Indeed, this disbelief in the threat
of successful cooperation sometimes waxes so confident as to prompt
calls from economic scholars to repeal the Sherman Act altogether. 53
None of these attitudes hangs or falls on the outcome of research on
the prisoner's dilemma. The most I can assert is that analysis of the
prisoner's dilemma has supported - not caused - skepticism about
the harmful consequences of reciprocity.
Yet, analysis of the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma concisely
and compellingly formulates criticism of antitrust doctrine's confidence that "tacit collusion is likely": it is a non sequitur to reason that
individuals within a group necessarily will do what is in their group's
self-interest. Indeed, the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma puts the
shoe on the other foot. It suggests that tacit group cooperation may be
the exception, not the rule, even in the smallest of groups.
50. American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 407 (1921). See note 17
supra and accompanying text.
51. Griffin, OPEC Behavior: A Test of Alternative Hypotheses, 15 AM. EcoN. REV. 954
(1985).
52. See, e.g., Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 EcoN. J. 41, 48 (1929) ("understandings
between competitors are notoriously fragile").
53. D. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST POLICY: THE CASE FOR REPEAL (1986); Smith, Why Not
Abolish Antitrust?, REG., Jan.-Feb. 1983, at 23.
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It is ironic, however, that the game theorists who had used the
prisoner's dilemma to establish the logical case against cooperation
were not delighted with their result. For instance, Shubik described
the noncooperative equilibrium of a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma as "logical and silly," 54 while Selten accepted the "logical validity" of this noncooperative equilibrium but rejected it "as a guide to
practical behavior." 55 Theorists continued to labor on a "solution" to
the prisoner's dilemma - thus suggesting that they thought have reciprocity was more likely in the real world than their model has implied.
These theorists have succeeded in specifying a variety of game conditions that might support cooperation as an equilibrium strategy to
the repeated prisoner's dilemma: infinite repetition of the game without too much discounting; 56 potentially infinite repetition with an exogenous and known probability that the repetition will terminate after
any given round; 57 finite repetition in which the players do not know
how many rounds remain; 58 finite repetition between players who have
a small but positive likelihood of being "crazy" or irrationally cooperative;59 and construction of a metagame in which players choose conditional strategies that can depend upon the choices made by the other
player. 60 These efforts showed that the logic of noncooperation was
not ineluctable.
These analyses failed, however, to marshal a case that cooperation
is more likely than competition. I summarize the objections seriatim.
All approaches relying upon infinite repetition are vulnerable to the
indeterminacy of the Folk Theorem, which specifies that eternal cooperation is a perfect Nash outcome - but so is a great variety of other
54. Shubik, Game Theory, Behavior, and the Paradox of the Prisoner's Dilemma: Three Solutions, 14 J. CONFLICT REsOLUTION 181, 184 (1970).
55. Selten, The Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 133 (1978). See also D.
LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 46, at 101. (The non-cooperative equilibrium "is not reasonable
in the sense that we predict most intelligent people would not play accordingly.... We feel that
in most cases an unarticulated collusion between the players will develop, much in the same way
as a mature economic market often exhibits a marked degree of collusion without any communication among the participants.")
This theoretical disquiet turns out to have some empirical basis. See cases cited in note 49
supra.
56. Rubinstein, Strong Pelfect Equilibrium in Supergames, 9 INTL. J. GAME THEORY 1
(1980). See also D. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, supra note 46, at 102 (infinite solution is "[i]ntuitively
... plausible").
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts & Wilson, Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma, 27 J. EcoN. THEORY 245 (1982).
60. N. HOWARD, PARADOXES OF RATIONALITY: THEORY OF METAGAMES AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR (1971); Howard, The Theory of Meta-games, 12 GEN. SYS. 167 (1966).
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patterns of action, including competition. 61 The assumption that, with
some probability, the prisoner's dilemma will end in any given round,
presents the same difficulty. A different version of the Folk Theorem
establishes that models using "crazy" players can generate an array of
equilibria simply by varying assumptions about the type of irrational
behavior. 62 Finally, the metagame approach does not fill the gap;
some criticize its general utility, 63 while even its supporters concede
that it "still needs to be translated in a social context." 64
For the antitrust context, then, this research implicitly acknowledged the possibility of tacit cartel collusion but was - at very best agnostic about the extent of its threat. Then came Axelrod.
C. Axe/rod's Analysis of the Evolution of Cooperation: The Success
of Tit-for-Tat
In the last decade, Axelrod's works have been hugely influential
because they make a stronger prediction: that cooperation is likely to
evolve between self-interested players in a repeated prisoner's dilemma. 65 Axelrod based this prediction on the striking success of a
particular strategy for the repeated prisoner's dilemma: Tit-for-Tat.
This strategy plays the prisoner's dilemma game by cooperating on the
game's first move, and then, on following turns, playing the same
move as its opponent played on the just-finished round. This strategy
is cooperative in three senses: it is "nice" 66 (because it initially tries to
cooperate); it is "retaliatory" 67 (because it quickly punishes opponents
who cheat by lowering price); and it is "forgiving" 68 (because it
quickly returns to cooperation after the other player renews efforts to
cooperate). Tit-for-Tat independently formalized a notion of cooperation enforcement that economists outside game theory long have described as "detecting significant deviations from the agreed-upon
61. E. Rasmusen, A New Version of the Folk Theorem: (June 28, 1988) (Anderson Graduate
School of Management UCLA, Business Economics Working Paper No. 87-6).
62. Fudenberg & Mask.in, The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with
Incomplete Information, 54 EcoNOMETRICA 533 (1986).
63. M. SHUBIK, supra note 43, at 328-31; Shubik, supra note 54, at 190.
64. Rapoport, Escape from Paradox, 217 Sci. AM. 50, 56 (1967).
65. R. AxELROD, supra note l; Axelrod, An Evolutionary Approach to Norms, 80 AM. PoL.
SCI. REV. 1095 (1986) [hereinafter Axelrod, Evolutionary Approach]; Axelrod, The Emergence of
Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 306 (1981); Axelrod, More Effective Choice
in the Prisoner's Dilemma, 24 J. CONFLICT REsoLUTION 379 (1980); Axelrod & Hamilton, The
Evolution of Cooperation, 211 SCI. 1390 (1981); see also Axelrod, Effective Choice in the Prisoner's
Dilemma, 24 J. CONFLICT REsoLUTION 3 (1980). Axelrod and Dion's Annotated Bibliography
on The Evolution of Cooperation (unpublished manuscript Sept. 1987) contained 236 references.
66. R. AxELROD, supra note 1, at 33.
67. Id. at 44.
68. Id. at 36.
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prices [that] ... will be matched by fellow conspirators if they are not
withdrawn. " 69
Axelrod had the brilliant idea of analyzing the repeated prisoner's
dilemma game by experimenting in a tournament format, with real
people submitting different candidate strategies that Axelrod then
paired off against each other. The tournament idea, like many great
ones, seems simple in retrospect. Here is how it worked. Consider the
following prisoner's dilemma matrix, which Axelrod used and which
is similar to the one discussed above70 (except that numbers are
switched from representing an undesirable quantity, like jail time, to
representing desirable goods, like dollars or winning points).
COLUMN PLAYER

cooperate

defect

(3,3)

(0,5)

p
R

0

L
A

cooperate

w y

E
defect
(5,0)
(1,1)
R
Parentheses: (points for ROW, points for COLUMN)

Had you responded to Axelrod's invitation to play in his first
tournament (an invitation that fifteen game theory types in fact
accepted), you would have submitted your pick of a strategy for
playing the repeated prisoner's dilemma. For example, one such
strategy is "always cooperate." The tit-for-tat submission was
"cooperate in the first round, and thereafter copy the opponent's last
move." The variety of conceivable strategies is infinite. Axelrod
pitted each of the fifteen strategies submitted against every other for
200 rounds. (For instance, the match of "always cooperate" against
"always defect" simply adds up the scores in the northeast cell 200
times. "Always cooperate" thus scores 0 and "always defect" scores
1000 for this match.) Axelrod then totaled the points that each
strategy won in every match and compared the overall results.
Axelrod conducted three variations of this basic tournament. In
the second tournament, he publicized his results, enlisted 63 instead of
15 players, and ran each match for a probabilistic number of rounds
with a mean of 151 (rather than the determinant 200 rounds). In a
third type of test, Axelrod altered the proportions of representative
strategies in six different ways and reran the second tournament six
69. Stigler, supra note 32, at 46.
70. See matrix at text following note 44 supra.
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times to determine how robust winning strategies were. Fourth,
Axelrod ran the strategies from the second tournament in an
"ecological" environment: after playing each strategy against every
other strategy one time, for the next round Axelrod changed a
strategy's representation in the total population to reflect that
strategy's average score in the previous round. Axelrod continued this
process for 1000 "generations."
Tit-for-Tat was spectacularly successful. Its total score beat all
other strategies' total scores in the first two tournaments. In the third
tournament - the set of six tests - Tit-for-Tat placed first in all but
one test, where it placed second. And in the fourth "ecological'' test,
Tit-for-Tat's total score was highest in the first round. Thereafter Titfor-Tat never relinquished this lead and by the lOOOth generation was
the most successful and fastest-growing rule.
These results seem sensational for antitrust. Axelrod's
tournaments seemed to offer, for the first time, a precise account of
whether - and why - the threat of producer reciprocity among,
profit maximizers is grave. Skeptics had scoffed that retaliation was
unlikely to lead to reciprocity between competitors because retaliation
would decrease profits and hence would be "as irrational and as
unlikely as predatory pricing." 71 The key implication of Axelrod's
work responded that short-run and long-run rationality differed
radically - with cooperation supplanting the logic of competition in
the long run. The reaction in legal literature was predictable: a
commentator announced that Axelrod's analysis suggested that "the
inevitability of competition within oligopolies and contract-rigging
consortiums may be only myths." 72 It seemed as though Axelrod's
work had vindicated tum-of-the-century judges against those judges'
modem critics.
As the commentator recognized, however, scholarly analysis of
reciprocity is still in its infancy. Axelrod was willing to extend his
conclusion to situations - Congress, war, and international relations
- that imply his results are widely applicable. Yet Axelrod's analysis
differs in many respects from the market problem that is the concern
of antitrust.
71. Y. BROZEN, supra note 41, at 136 (footnote omitted). See generally notes 32-41 supra
and accompanying text.
72. Huber, Competition, Conglomerates, and the Evolution of Cooperation (Book Review), 93
YALE L.J. 1147, 1157 (1984) (reviewing R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION
(1984)).
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Three Limits on Axe/rod's Antitrust Relevance

The promise of Axelrod's work for antitrust law has yet to be realized. Like any model, Axelrod's tournament research abstracts a great
deal from reality. These abstractions are points of practical frailty.
The binary character of choice in the prisoner's dilemma, for instance,
is a great simplification of real market environments. Firms normally
face an infinite array of competitive choices, on quality as well as price
attributes - and for a line of products, not just one. They can, in
other words, cheat on a cooperative arrangement a lot, a little, or not
at all - and in many different ways. But the binary limitation of Axelrod's tournaments is not necessarily a simplification that is misleading. Preliminary work by Bendor suggests that replacing a binary
choice with a prisoner's dilemma game offering continuous (but
bounded) choices produces results analogous to the binary game. 73
In a similar vein, Axelrod also employs an equilibrium concept of
collective stability. Boyd and Lorberbaum show that this solution
concept need not imply evolutionary stability. 74 Although any model
aimed at antitrust relevance would have to make explicit and defend
its choice of equilibrium concept, this point does not necessarily cast
doubt on the general character of Axelrod's results.
Three other general factors; however, do qualify heavily the present applicability of Axelrod's work to antitrust law. My point here, of
course, is not to scold Axelrod for shortsightedness. His pathbreaking
effort had a far more general aim than investigation of proper policy
for the Sherman Act. Rather my concern is to sketch the further work
that is needed before Axelrod's insights can be transferred to the market context with confidence.
1. Number and Size of Players
Axelrod's tournaments involve many competing strategies that interact with others, one at a time. A model of repeated encounters between pairs makes sense for many applications, for instance, a wolf
and a bear competing for caribou carcasses. In the market context,
however, competition between pairs occurs only in rare cases of duopoly. Usually more than two firms populate a market. Observations by
scholars outside the field of antitrust, 75 as well as more recent com73. Bendor, In Good Times and Bad: Reciprocity in an Uncertain World, 31 AM. J. POL. SCI.
531 (1987).
74. Boyd & Lorberbaum, No Pure Strategy Is Evolutionarily Stable in the Repeated Prisoner's
Dilemma Game, 327 NATURE 58 (1987).
75. R. HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 43 (1982); M. OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
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ments by Axelrod, 76 suggest that coordination becomes more difficult
as the number of players increases.
In fact, it has been a long-standing theme of the industrial organization literature that cartelizing grows more difficult as the number of
firms in the market increases.77 Indeed, this notion forms the very
premise of our merger law, which makes measures of industrial concentration the key determinant of merger legality. Axelrod's tournament approach thus does not model antitrust's crucial question about
reciprocity: How many firms does it take to make the prospect of cooperative pricing unlikely?
Recent analysis in Axelrod's tradition by Boyd and Richerson
stresses the importance of studying the likelihood of reciprocity in sizable groups. These authors show that the likelihood that Tit-for-Tat
will become common at a stable equilibrium diminishes rapidly as the
number of players increases. 78 Boyd and Richerson make no effort to
adapt their model to a market context. But their preliminary and
qualitative findings are consistent with economists' standard intuition
that collusion is difficult in a crowd. These insights suggest that an
Axelrodian fear of collusion may be limited to duopolies and similarly
extreme - and highly unusual - levels of market concentration.
The general idea that collusion is harder in sizable groups suggests
a related point. Conventional antitrust wisdom holds that successful
collusion produces supercompetitive returns, attracts entry, and thus
exacerbates the coordination problem. At the same time, the new entry diminishes all players' relative returns from cooperating rather
than cheating. Axelrod's analysis does not model these entry effects.
Because entry is the nemesis of long-run cartel success, this omission
may be an additional reason why future work in the spirit of Axelrod
may fail to support the prospect of viable long-run producer
reciprocity.
Finally, Axelrod uses a payoff matrix that presumes that players
have an equal ability to injure each other. Axelrod used a prisoner's
dilemma with a temptation of 5, reward for mutual cooperation of 3,
and a sucker's payoff of 0. 79 These values were the same for both players. In the market context, we might interpret this feature as an asNATIONS 29-34 (1982); M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
COMMUNITY, ANARCHY AND LIBERTY 53 (1982).

36 (1971); M. TAYLOR,

76. See Axelrod, Evolutionary Approach, supra note 65, at 1100.
77. E.g., F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
199 (2d ed. 1980).
78. Boyd & Richerson, supra note 44.
79. R. AxELROD, supra note 1, at 8. See note 44 and text at note 70 supra.

August 1988]

The Prisoner's Dilemma

1925

sumption that all players are of equal size, or that relative size is
irrelevant to the game's outcome. Yet conventional antitrust wisdom
asserts that the relative size of firms does matter. If Pepsi and Coke
merge to leave only tiny Shasta Cola, for instance, the standard attitude is that cooperation is more likely than if Coke has one half of the
market and Pepsi the other. Axelrod's analysis cannot inform us if
this conventional analysis is correct, backwards, or completely irrelevant, because his tournaments took no account of varying player size.
2.

Certainty

Axelrod's tournaments assumed that pairs of players understand
each others' moves perfectly. Firms, however, can err in interpreting
each others' market responses. A firm would commit a Type I error
by believing incorrectly that a rival had cut prices, and a Type II error
by failing to detect a rival's price cutting. so Examples of Type I errors
would arise if a cartel member believes a customer's lie (motivated by
the customer's effort to induce price cutting) that another cartel firm
cheated by cutting prices. Or suppose Saudi Arabia intends to limit its
output to quota levels, but simply makes an accounting error that
yields a larger output in some period. Or imagine Venezuela wants to
follow OPEC's price, but inadvertently provides a customer with an
added service that other OPEC players interpret to be quality competition. Type II errors, on the other hand, follow from the fact that
"[t]he detection of secret price-cutting will of course be as difficult as
interested people can make it." 81
Axelrod's tournaments cannot say whether "noisy" communication is a serious barrier to cooperation, because they implicitly assumed that one player could identify the other's move with perfect
certainty. Omitting treatment of uncertainty is a particularly significant weakness for antitrust law governing data exchanges and mergers. In these contexts, uncertainty about others' actions is highly
likely. Firms in these situations typically are anxious to conceal or
disguise noncooperative cheating, thus prompting Type II errors.
Conversely firms wish to correct others' Type I misperceptions, but
antitrust law's per se rule against price fixing makes this type of communicating extremely hazardous.
Several recent papers suggest that players' uncertainty about other
players' moves can alter dramatically the prospects for Tit-for-Tat's
success. Hirshleifer and Martinez Coll use a very simple model to an80. McKinnon, Stigler's Theory of Oligopoly: A Comment, 74 J. PoL. EcoN. 281, 281 (1966).
81. Stigler, supra note 32, at 47.
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alyze Tit-for-Tat's stability under conditions of uncertainty. The possibility that players might misinterpret the other's moves, these
authors find, can lead either to a cooperative or to a competitive equilibrium - depending on initial mix of strategies in the population. 82
Similarly, Bendor concludes that small levels of uncertainty cause
Tit-for-Tat to behave quite differently than it did in Axelrod's tournaments. 83 Bendor finds that two Tit-for-Tat players cannot sustain a
high level of cooperation when playing under such conditions. In the
generational or "ecological" setting, Tit-for-Tat's instability .creates an
opportunity for strategies with longer memories, which in turn can
attract exploiting competitive strategies. Bendor and Mookherjee also
find that very small errors of perception or external uncertainty can
alter dramatically the successful cooperation that can occur in a decentralized reciprocal relationship operating under complete certainty. 84 These works suggest that imperfect communication can
make successful cooperation far less of an antitrust threat than Axelrod's tournament results might imply.
3.

The Market Interpretation of a Tournament: How Do Firms
Learn?

It is difficult to interpret the first three of Axelrod's tournaments in
an antitrust context. Most literally, the analogy suggests an economy
that contains as many competing firms as Axelrod's tournaments contained competing strategies: 15 or 63. Each firm competes with all
others, but only one at a time - presumably by entering one product
or geographical market for 150-200 pricing periods, withdrawing, entering another product or geographical market, and so on. When the
rounds are completed, the firms total their profits and the richest one
"wins." This tournament model is poorly adapted to the antitrust
context. We never see firms engage in dilettantism of such widespread
and short-lived proportions.
Axelrod suggests that his fourth test - the generational or "ecological" tournament - is better tailored to a market analogy: "a rule
which was not scoring well might be less likely to appear in the future
for several different reasons. One possibility is . . . a person using a
rule sees that other strategies are more successful and therefore
82. Hirshleifer & Martinez Coll, What Strategies Can Support the Evolutionary Emergence of
Cooperation?, J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION (forthcoming).
83. Bendor, supra note 73, at 544-45.
84. Bendor & Mookherjee, Institutional Structure and the Logic of Ongoing Collective Action,
81 AM. PoL. SCI. REv. 129 (1987). See also Milgrom, Axe/rods The Evolution of Cooperation,
15 RAND J. ECON. 305, 308 (1984) ("The possibility of misinterpretation has significant effects
on the desirability of a TIT-FOR-TAT strategy.").
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switches to one of those strategies." 85 By conceiving of managers who
learn from others' experience in distant markets, Axelrod can avoid
the implausible need for an individual firm itself to enter and exit a
large number of markets.
Models of cultural transmission, however, depend crucially on the
details. 86 Axelrod's model assumes that, from one period to another,
strategies gather adherents among managers or firms in proportion to
each strategy's "success." But Axelrod defines success in a particular
and important way: the size of the total points won from interacting
with all players. 87 Put otherwise, Axelrod defines the most successful
strategy to be the one with the largest average point score. Tit-for-Tat
never defeats a rival in any one particular match. It cannot. But it
does well overall because it stimulates high-scoring cooperation with a
wide range of partners.
It is quite possible to define "success" differently. UCLA fans
might say a football season that includes a victory in the USC game is
more successful than a season that produces a higher-scoring point
average against all rivals but includes a loss to USC. Similarly, the
management philosophy of A vis might focus more on outselling Hertz
than on producing a high level of profit compared to the Fortune 500.
Similarly, Avis might consider its showing against Hertz to be a more
significant and reliable performance indicator than comparisons with
dissimilar firms in unrelated markets, where factors besides management skill complicate the comparison.
In terms of game theory, there is a dramatic difference between
setting a goal of victory or one of high payoff. 88 Stated in a second and
equivalent way, defining "success" in relative local terms can lead to
far different results than defining success in absolute or global average
terms. 8 9 Tit-for-Tat performs well under conditions that stress absolute payoff success but does very poorly when success and propagation
depend rather upon relative victories. Stated in yet a third way, Axelrod finds that a round-robin tournament favors cooperation - but cooperation is either stymied or eliminated altogether if the tournament
85. R. AxELROD, supra note 1, at 50.
86. R. BOYD & P. RICHERSON, CULTURE AND THE EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS passim
(1985). Cf. Milgrom, supra note 84, at 308 ("[T]here is still the problem of identifying who the
players in the game are.... Whenever anyone plays a game as part of a family, a firm, or any
other organization, there are always the questions of who the players are and to whom reputations attach.").
87. R. AXELROD, supra note 1.
88. Behr, Nice Guys Finish Last-Sometimes, 25 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 289 (1981).
89. See Boyd, Density-Dependent Mortality and the Evolution of Social Interactions, 30
ANIMAL BEHAV. 972 (1982).
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is an elimination bout in which the winning player survives and the
loser disappears. 90
Once again, Axelrod's results will require heavy qualification
before they can be applied to the antitrust context. One economic tradition prefers to model firm managers as relentless profit maximizers
who work to maximize shareholders' wealth, without regard to personal managerial goals like prestige, total corporate size, or machismo.
This tradition suggests that firm managers in fact might survey the
interactions of firms throughout the economy and adopt for themselves the strategy that produces the highest profit, on average, thus
supporting Axelrod's round-robin assumption and its cooperative result. But another tradition stresses that optimization may result primarily because efficient firms avoid competitive elimination. 91 If that
is the case, then the best model of strategy transmission may concentrate on a model of elimination bouts - thus suggesting that cooperation is highly unlikely to arise and that competition should flourish.
Once again, Axelrod's tournament results would imply results opposite to those most relevant for antitrust law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The two doctrines I have examined are important antitrust policy.
The law of data exchanges governs every market in the country, establishing what communication among competitors is permitted and
what is forbidden. Mergers today often involve millions, if not billions, of dollars. Yet over time the law that governs these everyday
economic transactions has made widely differing assumptions about
the vulnerability of competition to successful producer reciprocity.
These assumptions have been rooted in the merest conjecture about
the viability of harmful producer reciprocity. As thus should be expected, they have proven vulnerable to substantial revision with shifting political tides. There has been recent progress on a stouter theory
of reciprocity, but that progress should impress antitrust with its potential for - not its current offering of - useful insight. Until that
theory can give judges helpful generalizations about when cooperation
is more likely than competition, antitrust will continue to be based
only on the current fashion in guesswork.

90. Hirshleifer & Martinez Coll, supra note 82. See also R. SUGDEN, THE ECONOMICS OP
121 (1986).
91. See Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. ECON. 211 (1950).
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